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JPRS L/9944

28 August 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 42/81)



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CONTENTS

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

CNPF's Ceyrac Voices Views Opposing Mauroy's Program (Francois Ceyrac Interview; PARIS MATCH, 24 Jul 81).....	1
FO's Bergeron Explains Union's Future Attitude (Andre Bergeron Interview; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 18 Jul 81).....	8
Priorities of Planning Ministry's Rocard Discussed (Franz-Olivier Giesbert; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 18 Jul 81).....	12

POLITICAL

FRANCE

Pro-Soviet PCF Wing: Publish, Broadcast, Destabilize Marchais (Frederic Charpier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 11-17 Jul 81).....	15
Election Causes, Government Future, PCF, Unions (PROJET, Jul-Aug 81).....	18
Briefs Leroy Avoids Moscow Meeting	30

SPAIN

Polls Show 12 to 26 Percent of Basques Favor Independence (Jose Manuel Arija; CAMBIO 16, 13 Jul 81).....	31
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- a -

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MATRA 'Scorpion' Reconnaissance System
(AIR & COSMOS, 13 Jun 81)..... 38

- b -

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

CNPF'S CEYRAC VOICES VIEWS OPPOSING MAUROY'S PROGRAM

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 24 Jul 81 pp 52-55

[Excerpts from an interview with François Ceyrac by Jean Cau: "An Interview with the 'Boss of Bosses;' In the Midst of the Economic Battle, the Best Generals Are Dismissed"]

[Text] [Question] In Mr Mauroy's speech to the National Assembly, he took sides with you--without quoting you--when he said that the French people voted the way they did in May and June because they wanted new impetus and a new thrust, and "not because they wanted to rest in the shade of the forest." In listening to Mr Mauroy, did you notice an appeal for new efforts and hard work, or did his speech strike a different note for you?

[Answer] I must say before anything else that I do not engage in polemics. I observe things as they are. I told Mr Mauroy the following; "I will not mobilize business against you. Political opposition is political opposition. As for business, it is not in the opposition, it is only supposed to tell the truth. My role is to inform you: if I see certain needs or dangers, I will warn you in a matter of fact way." Having made this clear, I was pleasantly surprised to hear today--from some quarters, Mr Mauroy or Mr Delors--vigorous appeals for hard work. Mr Barre couldn't have done better. However, I am not at all sure that the French people voted as they did because they wanted to hear these words. Mr Mauroy will not make me change my mind or prevent me from thinking that it was for another reason.

It is my view then that after a long period of struggle, the French people all of a sudden heard voices telling them, "you should work less, the length of the work week should be reduced, exports should be decreased, because it's too hard, life should be easier, and so forth." What does that mean, if not to rest in the shade of the forest and breathe the fresh air while biding your time? The French people got the gist of Mr Mitterrand's speech. Now Mr Mauroy is changing the tune. The French people will understand, if they can.

[Question] In your opinion, Mr President, why in the world are they nationalizing? Some people have said that it is out of an almost mystical faithfulness to a myth. Do you think that ideology comes first in this affair and economic reasoning second? And if ideology is involved, what is the underlying goal?

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[Answer] I asked myself the question because this seemed to be such an obscure subject that I felt it deserved a little thought. It's true that in the past we nationalized because things were going badly. However, the groups being brought into the public sector today are among the most brilliant, the most dynamic, and the most efficient in the French economy. So they are not nationalizing them because things are not going well.

Are they nationalizing then because things are going well and they feel that they can make things go even better? The men heading these groups have demonstrated their ability and I am not so sure that a technocracy will do better. I think in fact that it will do worse. I therefore see no economic or technical reason. I don't have a political explanation either, since when Renault was nationalized in 1946 for political reasons, the decision was made not because the company was doing poorly, but because Louis Renault was accused of collaboration and convicted. To my knowledge, no legal action of this sort has been brought against the heads of the groups involved.

[Question] So there is no economic, technical or political explanation. What is left?

[Answer] We have to go back to the myth. In my opinion, nationalization will occur in 1981 because it was written into the Epinay program. And if it was written into that program, it is definitely because it was included in the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] program in 1934. The Socialist Party has an affinity for history and myths. Perhaps we need a myth to strengthen the ties between the communists and the socialists. And this myth is the myth of nationalization. No one dared bring up the one of the 200 families, but it's the same.

[Question] What can the practical consequences of nationalization of the banking sector be for non-nationalized companies and thus for small and medium-sized businesses and industries? Could a surface tension arise?

[Answer] Why is the banking sector being nationalized? The government at present has all the powers needed to regulate credit. Proof of this is that it decided to raise interest rates to heretofore unknown levels without consulting parliament. It controls credit ceilings, the Bank of France intervenes authoritatively and effectively in the banking business... What more do they want? Here again we see a myth involved--"the wall of money!" Since this wall of money was, to the liking of some, only partially demolished in 1946, the demolition is being pursued! The real question to answer today is whether the banks already nationalized are better serving their customers than private banks. If there were an appreciable difference between the two, if we could say that the Crédit Lyonnais, the Société Générale or the BNP [National Bank of Paris] offered larger loans, were more attentive to their customers' needs, and more compassionate with small and medium-sized businesses than other more arrogant and domineering banks, then I would understand. But allow me to say that to my knowledge it is impossible to find any notable differences in the quality of the service. Some companies have several banks. They use each one for a certain number of services. Nationalized banks are better in some areas, private banks in others. There is a whole range which allows for individual service. Private banks' behavior vis-à-vis their customers is no less

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good, efficient or open. Now tomorrow practically all competition among banks will be done away with.

[Question] There will no longer be a menu to choose from, but just a fixed-price meal!

[Answer] I heard Mr Mauroy say in response to some criticism: "Crédit Lyonnais and Société Générale are perfect, let's nationalize the others! The services will be just as good!" But they are already just as good! It's only that there will be one thing missing: there will be no more competition between the private sector and the public sector. Now this competition was good and effective. The only institutions left to emulate are the foreign banks. And here I wonder whether we really want to serve the foreign banks. Do we want to make them appear as the only competitors and the only possible factors of comparison for those who want to shop around?

[Question] Do you think that the nationalized companies are less dynamic, and if so why? In a work entitled "Changer," Mr Delors wrote, and I quote from memory, that "heads of national firms too often tended to take their hats and umbrellas, go to the offices of the political leaders, discuss with them how their firms were going, and then leave quite merrily with their umbrellas opened." He also said that we have to be careful not to create irresponsible companies. Is that a danger?

[Answer] Are you referring to industrial firms?

[Question] Yes.

[Answer] What is true for banks is even more glaringly true for industrial firms. Mr Mauroy again--and don't get the idea that he is my whipping-boy, but he is our prime minister--had this to say with regard to these firms: "Look at how the Renault company is doing!" Renault is doing well, but one of its most qualified representatives said that it was essential for the company to have a private competitor. The existence of a large firm of a comparable size is an important factor of efficiency. Competition between the two companies plays an extraordinarily useful and effective role as a mobilizer at all levels. It is because of this that the French automobile has attained a high degree of competitiveness, and has been able to maintain its position and even further improve it. What is true for Renault is also true for the companies we are discussing. As I said, they were highly competitive, they had proven this internationally, and it's hard to see how nationalization, by some singular virtue, could make them any more competitive.

In summary, there is a risk that two things could occur. The first would result from the waiting period before the laws are voted on this fall. Couldn't these large companies play out all their trump cards, given the highly uncertain situation in which they find themselves? Isn't there a danger that some steps may no longer be so difficult? This is probably not a good situation as any action would be taken in all alacrity.

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In the second place, our competitors are not fools. Aren't they going to try to profit from the situation? Some have in fact already begun.

Finally, how will customers in certain countries react? I am not going to enumerate these countries; you know as well as I which ones they are. They pay close attention to this kind of project and to the fact that our economic system could, by politicizing, lose a great deal of its reliability. All of this creates a less favorable situation for companies which have to cope with frightful foreign competition, where markets are taken away at the point of a sword, after difficult negotiations and ridiculous efforts. We have no idea of the difficulties encountered by the persons conducting these negotiations.

[Question] And then a decision is made in the shade of the forest that puts these men in a shaky, uncertain position...

[Answer] When an army is involved in a dangerous and precarious war and its leaders are wondering whether or not Paris is going to replace them or send them back... If I could draw a comparison, I would say that the companies to be nationalized are our battle corps, our armored offensive breaking through the lines in the economic war. Now suddenly, in the midst of battle, we upset the best fighters, we change the structures... That would certainly not create a climate conducive to victory.

[Question] Mr Delors said on June 27 that the businesses to be nationalized will account for only 16 percent of the gross national product.

[Answer] Wasn't that meant to reassure the population? Besides these large groups, there is their zone of influence... Doesn't one of them have 4,000 suppliers which are more or less working for it? When you take control of the one giving out work, you become the employer of the subcontractors. And in that case I can assure you that it is not a matter of a mere 16 percent.

[Question] Isn't there a danger that these companies will become rigid in their employment practices, since workers and management will have the impression of a greater sense of security?

[Answer] That's another story. Nothing that has been said would seem to indicate this at present. If by chance businesses were nationalized to create protected employment zones where workers would enjoy the same security as in the civil service, that would be detrimental to those businesses' efficiency.

[Question] And where is the money to compensate the shareholders going to be found?

[Answer] In the pockets of the taxpayers! Or by borrowing or something else. This is a political choice as much as an economic one.

The two main causes of concern when we think of compensation are the following: first, what will that cost the government? Since we are all taxpayers, we all have an interest in keeping the cost down. Then, the owners of the stock must be properly compensated. It's a matter of absolute justice. There cannot be

any despoliation, neither now nor in future. The compensation must therefore be computed fairly as of now and protected for the future. The problem of compensating the shareholder is critical, because it involves the national morality. The government cannot despoil even in the name of the nation.

There is another issue. In working out the compensation, should, as some think, the idea of discriminating between French and foreign shareholders be introduced? Some would agree to special treatment for the foreign shareholders because they are foreign, and less good treatment for the French because they are French, but this is unacceptable discrimination.

[Question] To go back to Renault, is it true that the company enjoyed a kind of privileged treatment, paying less taxes and receiving capital from the government? In other words, was the competition with Peugeot altogether fair?

[Answer] On this very delicate point, I will say just one thing. Take the amount of profit taxes paid by Renault and Peugeot from 1970 to 1980! You will see which company provided the most funds to the government budget during that period!

[Question] The government also talks about "spreading the power in companies." Do you feel to the contrary that counter-powers have already reached a threshold that it would be dangerous to go beyond? But what in your opinion does "spread the power in companies" really mean?

[Answer] Let's be serious: what power are we talking about? Administration's? Management's? But everyone participates in decisions in companies! And everyone at his level--the foreman, the office head, the director, the president. The one who makes decisions least frequently is the president.

Do they mean to mix decision-making levels? I find that very strange and I don't see how that fits in an organization chart. If that has any meaning, it is that they are going to give the union representatives a counter-power, and that would not be a diffused power, but a centralized one.

Actually, behind these harmless words a considerable risk is involved--that is that a unionist counter-power would be set up and the decision-making capacity at all levels would be diminished or hampered.

Here again we are dealing with an unknown factor. They use vague images, they assure us by saying that there will never be veto power... We say: "So much the better. We will see!" We are still in this nebulous phase which was just only partly clarified by the prime minister.

[Question] Don't you think that shortening the work week might worsen the already bad problem of the black market in labor?

[Answer] Mr Monory said that this market accounted for 12 percent of French goods...

[Question] This is the submerged economy, as the Italians say.

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[Answer] In France it is already one-third the size of the Italian market...

[Question] I have noticed that some of the illegal workers are civil servants.

[Answer] Not to blame them, but the most active ones in this area are those with the most job security and little pressure on the job.

[Question] As a joke, we could say that the moonlighting work of teachers was politics!

[Answer] They are in the process of proving that they are gifted. As for shortening the work week, we have said that we would agree to make an effort by lowering the legal time to 39 hours a week. But in view of the cost of the operation, there have to be offsetting measures. This social advance must be compensated by improved productivity. That having been said, I am not convinced that the main concern of French workers is to go from 40 to 35 hours. I have the feeling that here too political circles have a rather outdated view of the problem of the length of the work week. I have the impression that they are not altogether in tune with the realities and aspirations of 1981. We know perfectly well that what is important today is to give more freedom and flexibility to workers so that they can adapt their work to their family or personal concerns. It is only fair to make progress in this direction, but always with the concern of achieving a greater return on plant and equipment. As we have said, our foreign competitors know how to use their equipment better than we do. How is it that they are able to make their machines turn 50 percent more? Because work hours are much more flexible and they have separated men's work from machines' work. This is the basic requisite for any social progress in this area. Otherwise it will just be another burden, another impediment, and the corset enclosing French business will be tightened a notch further. It will have a little more difficulty breathing, and everything will move in the same direction as "étatisation" [governmentization], nationalization and government intervention.

[Question] A subtle difference has been made between nationalization and "étatisation" a difference the French people have trouble understanding.

[Answer] Me too! I think that nationalization means control by the nation or ownership by the nation and "étatisation" means government intervention. But since to my knowledge no one in France has ever differentiated the state [État] from the nation and since it is the state that embodies the nation, when we say "nationalization" we are inevitably saying "étatisation." I would like to know how nationalization could be done without the state and without administrative intervention in a country such as ours.

[Question] Won't nationalizations gradually create a state of mind that goes beyond strict economics? The government puts its hand on the banking sector, Saint-Gobain, Pechiney, etc. But might not the spot of oil which begins with the economy spread to schools, medicine, land holding, etc.?

[Answer] I am afraid that under Socialist policy no sector can escape the general movement. Some are more exposed but they all will have their little part, one

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after the other. The three sectors you referred to--education, medicine and farming--are already the objects of considerable attention, because the current government has an overall concept of the collective society.

[Question] Have you had an opportunity to say all this to Mr Mauroy and our political leaders?

[Answer] Given my position, I gave my views, and warned of evils and dangers, as I told you in the beginning of this interview.

[Question] And preached in the desert?

François Ceyrac makes the gesture of opening his arms and gives me a questioning look.

July 1981... Direct from the CNPF. Jean Cau (as they say on the radio). And now (still as they say on the radio...) let's see how all those leaving on vacation are doing and if Bison Fûte doesn't have enough worries with the four million drivers who have just left... I am calling the communist party in Rosny-sous-Bois... Hello, Pierre Duschnock, can you hear me? Is everything all right?

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

FO'S BERGERON EXPLAINS UNION'S FUTURE ATTITUDE

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18 Jul 81 pp 32-33

[Interview with André Bergeron, Secretary-General of the Workers Force, by Lucien Rioux.]

[Text] [Question] Have you already felt the effects of this change we are hearing so much about?

[Answer] In attitude, of course. Contacts with this government are much easier than with previous ones. For the rest, I can't say anything. There are still problems to be solved, which is neither surprising nor something to be ashamed of. The presidential elections were held on 10 May and now it's July. We have to give the new government time to study the files.

[Question] The labor unionist just gave his opinion. But what does the man, André Bergeron, think about this?

[Answer] I have always said that democracy cannot exist without a rotation of power, that it is not good to leave the same people in the same jobs for too long. If new governments run into difficulties, it is partly because they have been away from responsibilities for 23 years. Thus the change which has occurred is not only natural but necessary. For the rest, we will judge by actions. When the decisions made are in line with the interests of those we represent, we will say so, and when they seem to be opposed, we will say that too. I don't think that it's good for democracy for labor unions to behave in any other way. I never said that the labor union movement should become a counter-power; when need be, it should be a counterbalance to power.

[Question] What's the difference between counter-power and counterbalance?

[Answer] Counter-power advocates want to assume all or part of the responsibilities which, in our view, belong to the political power. Workers Force [FO] is against this. When General de Gaulle, in his proposed 1969 reform, wanted to give labor unionists powers in his regional councils in areas that did not concern them, we opposed it. Not out of hostility to the General's policy line, but because we felt that the role our militants were being given to play was dangerous.

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[Question] And counterbalance?

[Answer] Government policy can jeopardize workers' interests--by blocking salaries or by setting limits on wage increases, for instance. By speaking out or taking action against this policy, the labor union acts as a natural counterbalance.

[Question] The elections brought the Left back into balance. But wasn't this result achieved by a policy contrary to the one you were advocating? You wanted to isolate the communists, but it was by bringing them into the Union of the Left that François Mitterrand weakened them.

[Answer] The Communist Party and the General Confederation of Labor [CGT] are just the same as they've always been. They suffered a loss of influence. Will it last? I don't know. What I do know is that basically they have not changed. By chance I met up with a Vietnamese couple who fled their country in 1978 on one of those boats we've heard so much about. It was a doctor and his wife, and they experienced the camps in Vietnam and told me about them... It's terrifying! The appeasing words of the French Communists do not make me forget that they approved of that.

For us, for me, it is a basic issue: it concerns the type of society and men's place in society. The communists came out of the elections in a weakened position, and I am delighted about it. But they are still communists, hence objects of concern.

[Question] Hasn't the time come to complete the restored political balance of the Left by restoring the balance of labor unions? Workers Force now has a number of points in common with the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] and the National Education Federation [FEN]. Why don't you associate more closely with them?

[Answer] We have excellent relations with the leaders of the FEN and the National Teachers Union. We see each other frequently. Both officially and in private, and our views are similar.

With the CFDT, it's different. Our concepts of a labor union differ. I do not mean to question the honesty and sincerity of the CFDT militants. But look at what has happened in the past few weeks. The CFDT has from all appearances done everything it could to infiltrate the government. You can find its men throughout the wheels of the political apparatus. This is its business. Don't ask me to go along with it! I told Pierre Mauroy: "We don't want to have one foot in the government and the other in the labor union movement." For us, the labor union should be completely separate from the government and its parties, whatever they are. Otherwise it could no longer play its role as a counterbalance. That doesn't mean that we are going to complicate the work of the present government. We have never practiced demagoguery, and we won't begin now.

[Question] Haven't the militants of the CFDT--and the FEN, too (André Henry was its secretary general)--grown away from their original organization by penetrating the government apparatus?

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[Answer] Do you really think so? My impression is no. In my opinion, everybody should stay in their place: it is up to the parties to direct the government, to us to defend the special interests of workers.

[Question] So you refuse any reconciliation with the CFDT, even though it is clearly drawing away from the CGT?

[Answer] Look. We had very close contacts with the CFDT about 12 years ago, I believe. Delegations from the two organizations used to meet every month. At the end of one year, our representatives came back saying, "We don't know what these people want." You see, we had neither the same roots nor the same background, so how could we have the same views? That's how it is! I even made the commitment not to accept any official contacts with the CFDT until our national confederal committee had deliberated. This is an important committee which groups together the secretaries of departmental unions and national federations. We do not share CFDT's ideas on self-management, democratic planning, and such. Discussions will begin on the occasion of what is called the increase in workers' rights in firms. We will observe the positions taken.

[Question] So it's a stand-off situation, then?

[Answer] No! A wait-and-see situation. The 10 May and subsequent elections altered the political situation in the country. They did not upset the relationship among labor unions.

[Question] How do you intend to behave with the Communist ministers?

[Answer] The same as with the other ministers. We do not contest the right of the president of the Republic and the prime minister to choose whomever they wish as their ministers. This is their responsibility, not mine. So we will have talks with the Communist ministers--that include me, if necessary.

[Question] Aren't you afraid that they are in favor of seizure by the CGT of the sectors under their control?

[Answer] You know, we have Workers Force unions doing very well in municipalities held by the Communist Party, which supports my idea that you cannot be the governed and the governing at the same time.

[Question] To conclude, what do you expect from this new administration?

[Answer] Not everything! I do not question its desire to do well. That we can assume. But I know that the socialist ministers' margin of maneuver is narrow. France is not a universe unto itself. The serious economic crisis in the world did not end the evening of 10 May. It continues and will continue. The older industrialized countries of Europe have had a monopoly over the manufacturing business for 150 years. Now they are losing this monopoly, because of profound transformations which have taken place and continue to take place. Decolonization for example--we were all for it, naturally. We are delighted that great countries are entering the phase of modern development. But all this leads to a change in

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the relationship among industrial, economic and monetary forces in the world. This is why we are more and more convinced of the need to strengthen the European Community.

[Question] A united Europe as a remedy to the crisis, then?

[Answer] No, as a way to survive. If we do not achieve concrete results on economic, financial, industrial and social issues within the Community, we are going to encounter even more serious problems which can jeopardize democracy and peace. Because our economies are interdependent, we already have no hope of achieving social progress unless it affects all the countries of Western Europe at about the same time. Is this possible in the short run? The Luxembourg summit was not very encouraging. François Mitterrand's proposals--which I support--did not receive the response they deserved, even from the social-democratic governments.

The Workers Force will act intelligently and realistically. We have acted realistically in the past and been dragged through the mud. The times and politics have changed, but we will not change our attitude. We will continue to defend these ideas, because we believe they are fair.

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ECONOMIC

FRANCE

PRIORITIES OF PLANNING MINISTRY'S ROCARD DISCUSSED

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 18 Jul 81 pp 30-31

[Excerpts from article by Franz-Olivier Giesbert]

[Excerpts] How is it that they are saying at the Elysee that he sulks and at the Matignon that he is moody? It's not important now, in any case. Michel Rocard received a letter from the prime minister the other week setting forth his functions: apparently, they are considerable. In charge of planning, tomorrow he may be nothing more than a super-commissioner of planning under the president's orders, but he could also become one of the great architects of the new socialist France.

He knows this. At Rue de Varenne, behind the brand new plaque decorating the door of the first planning minister in the history of France, Michel Rocard does not have the sullen look attributed to him. On the contrary, he receives labor unionists, employers and suggestions with a kind of grandiloquence. From Savary to Chevenement, his "dear colleagues" in the government have all told him the same thing: "Support me. Everything is going to go through you." And he takes them at their word, this man who is called "the minister of the future." "We are the receptacle of all the dreams and all the reforms that the ministries want to enact in a broader framework."

In view of what he has been voicing openly for years, we are not betraying any secret when we say that the "minister of the future" cannot be enthusiastic about Mitterrand's and Mauroy's economic and industrial program. He has not, however, spoken out in the council of ministers against the huge wave of nationalizations. Along with Delors and Fabius, the other two ministers involved, he even seems ready to do everything to make "the overloaded boat"--as he would have called it just a short time ago--sail. The two-year plan he is fast developing--too fast, because of circumstances--has no other objective than that. Work begins Monday.

"A Burning Obligation"

And the report will be wrapped up--botched up, says the opposition--in two months before being voted on by parliament at the end of the year. In these circumstances, there is no chance for "democratic planning" in the style of the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]: the government doesn't have the time. But Rocard has given the following orders for the recruitment of his planning commission: "I want the least possible number of civil servants!" Just like the Republic, the planning ministry has left the era of bureaucracy....

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Neither Rocard nor his commission will have carte blanche: just like Matignon, the Elysee intends to keep a close eye on things. For Mitterrand's men, the two-year plan is designed to "develop the link between economic transformation and national solidarity." In its eyes, the government must constantly navigate between two perils: on one side, "Saint Simon's temptation" and disorder in companies; and, on the other, the "Salvation Army" syndrome and an exaggerated welfare state, following the British model. It will be up to the new planning ministry to set the path between these pitfalls, and to give coherence to the structural reforms which will turn the French economy topsy-turvy in 24 months.

The Japanese example has proven that a society can obtain results when it is able to get all classes of society to participate in its objectives. The Rocard plan is there for that reason precisely. Moreover, planning was even invented for that purpose. People has simply forgotten it. A return to the source, then, and to Liberation.

Today the government intends to revive this plan that was put to rest. The entire government, including Defferre. The enormous decentralization reform will not destroy the plan before it is even resurrected, or so they say. Naturally, it is the provinces and no longer Paris that will be deciding on public and community facilities, i.e., housing and schools. But everything will not be delegated to the provinces. The main industrial or agricultural policy lines will still be set in the capital, for instance. Take a look at the Federal Republic of Germany, a decentralized country par excellence. Legend has it that it has no government plan. That's wrong: the highly detailed Finanzplanung programs public finance for a three-year period. If the new planning office is in any danger, it is that it would be reduced to zero during the implementation phase by Finance and Budget, as happened under Giscard. The knives are already being sharpened on Rue de Rivoli. It's a question of habit. And if the budget officials have the final word when the Rocard plan is ready to be enacted (Oh! So sorry. I don't have a penny left for that."), then this plan can be stacked in the attic of planning myths, next to the Albert plan.

But there is another danger which is the exact opposite: that the planning ministry would become a cumbersome bureaucracy with its hand in everything. Philosophically and pathologically, Rocard can only turn his back on what he calls "the cathedral plan." Nevertheless, in the next few months the new leaders will have so many controls at their fingertips with the nationalizations that they could lead the country wherever they wished without even having to raise their voices.

"We will have more power," acknowledged one of the president's men. "Our capacity for error will be larger, accordingly." And it has never been demonstrated that the plan is always right or the market always wrong. After all, these are conscientious, wise and of course omniscient high officials behind the concorde and steel fiascos. Rocard is aware of this. Now he just has to think of what can act as a counterbalance in the decision-making process so that the next plan (1984-88), the great one of the septennate, will not make the wrong industrial choices.

Three Birds with One Stone

In the meantime, the minister is quickly trying to set priorities for the next two years. As far as industry is concerned, there are no surprises: first machine

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tools, robotics, telematics and biochemistry will be entitled a boost by the government. By way of strategy, Rocard will take up the same crusade as Monnet did 35 years ago to reconquer the domestic market. Clearly French goods are less and less frequently "made in France." It is still all right to import soybeans, but to have a shortage in the meat, poultry and fish sector is incomprehensible. We buy our wood abroad while we have immense forests. And the height of absurdity, lavender is now coming from the Eastern European countries, as is foie gras, while Italy is bombarding us with chestnuts. If you all all this up, it weighs heavily, very heavily on our trade balance. What can we do? Well, the government will try to bring production back up in all these areas. If this is successful, it will revitalize the economic fiber of dying rural districts, and create jobs or kill three birds with one stone.

This is only one example of the "shock actions" being worked out today by the new planners. The "minister of the future" is grinding away on them while discovering more and more every day that he is one of the four or five men on whose shoulders the responsibility for the success or failure of the leftist government will rest. He greets this discovery with a mixture of contentment...and bewilderment.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PRO-SOVIET PCF WING: PUBLISH, BROADCAST, DESTABILIZE MARCHAIS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Jul 81 p 32

[Article by Frederic Charpier]

[Text] Some "critical communists" held a meeting on Wednesday, 8 July, in Saint-Germain-des-Pres and denounced the PCF's mistakes that led it to a "subordinate position" within the left, which has now attained power. Those communists--Henri Fiszbin, Francois Hincker, Eddy Kenig, etc.--blame the party's leadership for breaking ranks in 1977 with the PS and since following a disastrous "sectarian" policy. But another diametrically opposed, pro-Soviet criticism is developing within the PCF. Frederic Charpier provides us with a very interesting report of a recent, equally "dissident" meeting of supporters of this other opposition. Doesn't this dichotomy ultimately play into the hands of Georges Marchais by enabling him, to justify that he has a clear conscience, to simultaneously denounce, using a tried and true method, the "opportunism" on his right and on his left?

In a house in the middle-class, not the red, suburbs of Paris, a very odd meeting was held on Saturday, 27 June. About 40 communists had gotten together on that day to decide together on the measures to be taken to thwart the party leadership's current policy. Were these communists nostalgic for the former Union of the Left, "rightist opportunists," as they are called in the party? Not at all. On the contrary, they were pro-Soviet, if not Stalinist, dissidents who had met together as a result of their common belief in the "real socialism" of Eastern countries and who were very determined to try anything to prevent the PCF from continuing to compromise itself in an opportunistic government adventure.

There were about 40 militants there, former officials, cadres, elected municipal officials, journalists, writers and even two federal secretaries, who considered the political terms endorsed by the PCF leadership, so that four communist ministers could get into the government, to be warning signals. Since the agreement made with the PS on Afghanistan, SS 20 missiles and Poland constituted a veritable declaration of war against the Soviet Union in their eyes, they considered it unacceptable. In short, on 27 June the party's hard-liners held a sort of "French-style Katowice forum"--the expression was coined by one of the participants--as the Polish party's hard-liners did in opposition to the concessions made to the Solidarity trade union.

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Their objectives: "to destabilize" Georges Marchais, to get the four communist ministers out of the government and even, if necessary, to establish another pure, hard-line party. Soviet intervention in Poland, which they openly say is one of their desires, would aid their plan: "It would be a blessing for the pro-Soviet French," one of them acknowledged. "Regaining control of the PZPR [Polish United Workers Party] would cause a split in the PCF, of which we would make the most." Their plans: first, to establish a liaison report which, like that of Henri Fiszbin and his friends on the other side, would make possible those noted horizontal links of which the PCF has always been terrified; next, the use of an uncommitted radio station--perhaps Radio Argenteuil, a city whose communist municipal government would probably include some supporters of the new revolt. All of this would be done with the support of federations which are claimed to be politically "tied to the East," such as that of Nord-Pas-de-Calais and, to a lesser extent, that of Bouches-du-Rhone, with the added bonus of the "benevolent neutrality" of a CPSU representative in Paris who, having been informed, has apparently not raised any objection on principle, but has also not made any further commitment.

Insult Count

How many are they, these dissidents who have placed their future struggles--the plans have been postponed until after the summer vacation--under the saintly patronage of Jeannette Veermersch, the intransigent and also quite forgotten widow of Maurice Thorez, who has never approved of her party's unified strategy? In truth, they are not many, and they recognize this. Of course, they noted that at the last Central Committee meeting, the treasurer of the party, Georges Gosnat, slipped a warning into his speech concerning the dangers of a break with the Soviet Union. And they firmly maintain that three members of that assembly of party officials would be ready to take action with them when the time came.

But they also know that theirs is also an extremely minority movement. For several reasons: first, because they are going against the grain. The communist electorate forced the party's leadership to abruptly adopt a unified policy which, like it or not, the majority supported. Secondly, because they have lost their credibility by endorsing, with their silence of yesterday, the policy which they condemn today. "We were wrong to hide under the table and to look like we supported the unified policy," one of the intellectuals of the conspiracy admitted. "But we are going to get busy. After all, the Katowice participants are also going against the grain for the time being."

Finally, the pro-Soviets have been systematically eliminated from the organization's key positions, at least during the period preceding the cold war between the PCF and the PS, "in favor of the politicians of Marchais," a municipal cadre grumbled, bitterly noting the insults swallowed--the least of which was not Roland Leroy's ouster from the party secretariat at the 23rd congress, "because of Guy Hermier, a dyed-in-the-wool pro-Soviet, however, who did not hesitate, for personal reasons, to foster suspicion concerning the editor of L'HUMANITE!" And then there was the more discreet departure of Henri Alleg from L'HUMANITE's general secretariat. The author of "La Question" [The Question]--his personal account of torture during the Algerian War--also a pro-Soviet, must have exhibited some weariness at being assigned too often to take his party's messages to the Soviet Embassy in protest of some abuse of human rights in the USSR. This is not to mention a number of other less important

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pro-Soviets who quietly left the party, discouraged by the incomprehensible fits and starts of the Marchais policy.

The present dissidents have decided to mobilize themselves on the basis of these inconsistencies. They will hold another meeting after the summer vacation. But it is a good bet that Georges Marchais will not let them do it. And that after striking a blow to his liberal wing, with Henri Fiszbin and his friends, he will also deal a blow to his sectarian wing to "bring the party back into line." That spells trouble for the "great debate" scheduled to get underway in October among the militants. Most definitely, it is very difficult nowadays to govern from the center

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

ELECTION CAUSES, GOVERNMENT FUTURE, PCF, UNIONS

Paris PROJET in French Jul-Aug 81 pp 783-798

[PROJET roundtable with Jean Charlot, Marcel Gonin, Jacques Moreau, Jean-Luc Parodi, Hugues Portelli, Rene Remond, and Colette Ysmal] After the balloting of 26 April and 10 May 1981, PROJECT organized a roundtable discussion with Jean Charlot (professor of the Institute of Political Studies in Paris), Marcel Gouin (CFDT), Jacques Moreau (deputy in European Assembly), Jean-Luc Parodi (CEVIPOF), Hugues Portelli (University of Paris X), and Colette Ysmal (CEVIPOF). For practical reasons this roundtable discussion took place before the legislative elections, and the reader must bear this in mind.]

[Excerpts] Last 10 May France elected a socialist president of the republic. Without tarrying over the numerical results,¹ may we analyze the causes of the failure of V. Giscard d'Estaing and those of F. Mitterrand's victory?

Jean Charlot: If first of all the first round of 1981 is compared to that of 1974 in percentages of registered voters--for participation was different--a backing off of both the right and the left in 1981 will be found, in favor of the ecologist vote, abstention, blanks and voids. But this double backing off is assymetrical: the left backs off very slightly (less than a point), and the right loses between 4 and 5 points. Moreover, on the right it is V. Giscard d'Estaing who backs off the most, while on the left it is G. Marchais. The two major candidates do not enter the second round with a personal defeat and a much lower working capital of votes; on the other hand, F. Mitterrand, aside from a personal success and a less serious handicap than in 1974, by comparison with V. Giscard d'Estaing, has at his disposal a reserve of ecologist voters, and benefits from the failure of G. Marchais which will favor the carry-over of the middle-of-the-road votes.

In the second round, following the recording of the carry-overs of the Communist Party, F. Mitterrand quite liberally fills the tank with votes from the left, in spite of marginal abstention by the communist voters in certain fiefs of the PCF, and advances strongly thanks to the electorate of the ecologists. V. Giscard d'Estaing does not have the advantage of all of the Chirac voters of the first round; part of them go over to the abstention side, even to F. Mitterrand. But even if the voters of J. Chirac had voted for V. Giscard d'Estaing in the second round,

¹ As usual, PROJET will publish in No 158 (September, October) an in-depth analysis of the results of this balloting and those of the legislative elections of 14 and 21 June, by Alain Lancelot.

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as did those of J. Chaban-Delmas in 1974, the result would have been the same: his defeat was a foregone conclusion following the first round.

The deep-seated reasons for this defeat, which are twofold, must be sought farther.

First of all, the outgoing president had broken up his majority. The crisis between RPR and Giscardians had been permanent since 1976, and V. Giscard d'Estaing had missed a chance to "stick the pieces back together" in his majority after the legislative elections of 1978. At that time he could have given a more normal share to the deputies of the RPR within the majority and in the government. On the contrary, he continued to put off the RPR, which was, however, the majority of the majority. He therefore gave rise to the coalition of the Gaullists around J. Chirac, and, in the end, the latter's campaign for the presidential election.

The second deep-seated political reason for this failure also goes back to 1978. After the legislative elections, the president ought not to have kept R. Barre as chief of the government. The prime minister's unpopularity was such that it was to bring on that of the president. He then did not know how to use the resources of the constitution which make it possible to sacrifice a prime minister in order to get back one's "political virginity."

These two basic reasons are, of course, in addition to a negative economic and social setting for the outgoing president who was, besides, the stake of the electoral campaign.

PROJET: Can V. Giscard d'Estaing's failure be explained by the man's style, strongly criticized, and because 14 years is too much?

Colette Ysmal: I agree with J. Charlot about the strategies of V. Giscard d'Estaing regarding the RPR, but I believe his basic error goes back to before 1978. In fact, he ought never to have given J. Chirac the opportunity to become mayor of Paris, which provided him with an exceptional forum.

But, in my opinion, there is also an important socioeconomic reason: the crisis heightened tensions within society inasmuch as it was a factor of discontent. V. Giscard d'Estaing showed himself to be incapable of responding to these tensions, of modernizing the French economy without causing the most disadvantaged wage-earners to have to pay the price for it exclusively. Of course, these tensions already existed in 1973, but the legislative elections are a more fragmented type of balloting (hence more difficult for the opposition) and it was a time of much dissension on the left, which had enabled the right to win once more.

The man's style is based on that: the way in which he held the French in contempt, not only the masses, but also the political elite, simply speeded up the shifting movement between power and society.

Rene Remond: In terms of political psychology, there is a surprise effect. It must be remembered that just a few months ago everybody was betting that V. Giscard d'Estaing would be reelected without any problem. The causes of his defeat, already at work, were not readily apparent. So what happened to make them develop there effect?

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The event of 10 May abruptly reveals things about French society that it did not suspect about itself: it is a skylight opening upon the collective unconscious. First of all, there exists a periodic urge towards the renewal of mankind, towards a change, once a decade, even a limited one. V. Giscard d'Estaing benefited from this desire for change in 1974: in comparison with the "UDR State" he represented a novelty; let us remember the "from this day onward a new era has begun" theme orchestrated by the press and accepted by public opinion. Previously there had been 1958, and since then 1968. France therefore was wanting a change. I also wonder if keeping the same prime minister in office for almost 5 years was not a mistake. For these past few years we had been living with the idea that power constituted an advantage for the one who held it, as if a situation income were attached to the exercising of power and guaranteed it an indefinite renewal: this situation is quite ambivalent; we have just found that out through experience. Added to that is the fact that while 7 years is long enough, 14 years is far too much: if V. Giscard d'Estaing had announced that he would shorten his second 7-year term, he undoubtedly would have obtained several hundreds of thousands of additional votes.

The division of the right-wing parties, a second failure factor, goes much farther than a quarrel among chiefs. From the day after the elections in 1974 the persons closest to the president, particularly Mr Poniatowski, assumed the grave responsibility of attacking the Gaullists, of worrying them--enough to alienate them from themselves, not enough to destroy them--and then the majority suffered greatly from it.

Anyhow, this 7-year period marvellously illustrates the ambiguity of liberalism. There was a shift from liberal reformism in 1974-75 to a conservative, if not reactionary policy at the end of the 7-year period. Those who disapproved of the liberal initiatives of the early days have not forgiven V. Giscard d'Estaing for them; and the slip towards the right alienated another section of the electorate from him. More generally, a year ago everybody was thinking that society had a yearning for security: all of the political formations, except the PS, emphasized this major theme of authority and security. It was an illusion, an evaluation error which disregarded the French population's desire for liberation.

Jacques Moreau: I will add three comments. Instead of bringing it together, V. Giscard d'Estaing, for 7 years, added fuel to the fire of the dissension in the majority of 1974. Then the electoral reserves from which he had been benefiting indeed gradually disappeared because of the steps taken, the liberals first, the conservatives afterwards. I think that the social categories which failed him and provided troops for J. Chirac are not so much the wage-earners as they are the small merchants, farmers and middle-class people of the cities in the provinces. In the end, there were no longer any reserves in the center: today those who used to be reluctant to take sides politically have caused a burst in the center, which is now either behind V. Giscard d'Estaing or behind F. Mitterrand.

Jean Charlot: The new center, in the long run, is ecology, which is now a reserve for the left and no longer for the right. Moreover, there is another significant slippage, that of the young people between 18 and 20. The latter, when they voted for the right, more often voted for Chirac than for Giscard. Here we can see the evolution emphasized by Rene Remond between the beginning and the end of the 7-year period: in 1974 it was the right to vote for youngsters after the age of 18, the liberalization of abortion and the divorce law; at the end of the 7-year period, all that was forgotten. When they voted for the left, the young people voted communist (as compared to 21 percent in 1978). This impressive drop is linked with the combination of circumstances, and shows a certain political realignment.

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Hugues Portelli: I believe that V. Giscard d'Estaing made another error full of grave consequences at the beginning of his 7-year term. He needed to create a president's party starting in 1974, just as General de Gaulle had done. Now, despite some attempts to develop the Republican Party, Giscard d'Estaing really did not want to make it the dominant party, though he had the constitutional means for such action. He did not even develop his own political class: at the time of the electoral campaign of 1981, moreover, he had trouble forming a new team, and finally fell back on influential persons of the UDF. For want of a serious political structure, V. Giscard d'Estaing did not carry out his campaign with new themes, and kept coming back to the image of the outgoing president; he let himself get hemmed in by the RPR, whereas he could have taken advantage of the fact that, with each candidate representing one of the major tendencies, his own was far from being the worst.

Jean-Luc Parodi: On the interpretation of the event, I believe that the deeper movements are being forgotten. At the beginning of 1977, the saying was: "At every electoral voting the left slowly progresses through the socialist party; the communist party gradually crumbles." And then came the great splitting of each of the two coalitions, and the disillusion of the voters of the left in 1978. At that time the prevailing impression was that everything was coming to a standstill. Today the resuming of a great movement of unity is felt: the crisis of the 1977-80 period has been erased. On the left, at least, the quarrel of the rival associates, Coluche and the "band of four," etc. are being erased to go back to a period of hope for unity.

Second comment, the absence of alternation in French political life was causing the desire for change to grow. In all European countries, a very slight propensity among the younger voters to vote for the left is seen. But in no country of Europe today is such a distortion between the vote of the youngest and that of the oldest seen, which proves the wish for change, which very likely will drop again in coming years.

Last of all, I do not believe that there has ever been in the Fifth Republic a president's party, but only presidential majorities with, sometimes, mini-dissidences. At the beginning of his mandate V. Giscard d'Estaing came up against the competition of the other parties of the majority: he succeeded neither in constructing a true president's majority nor in making a real competition for his benefit. But, in any case, there was no room for a party of a dominating president.

PROJET: If we turn to the other side, can we now explain F. Mitterrand's victory?

Jean Charlot: Before 1978, polls were already giving a score of 52/48 percent in favor of the left. Potentially the left thus has been obtaining 52 percent of the votes for years. In 1981, the right lost starting with the first round, but the left did not really win until the second one. The fundamental factor in F. Mitterrand's victory is the PCF's score in the first round: the bolt came undone. And so today we again find hope for unity on the left, but in a very different way from the time before the break! It does not proceed from an agreement at the top between the two major parties of the left, but from the base, from a unitarian thrust of the communist voters, who, with some of them going over to the socialist vote, thus "trapped" their party, made it hop on to the left's train which was already rolling towards victory.

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Jean-Luc Parodi: Did we not already get fooled by the polls of the years 1979-80? Between 1974 and 1978, in all of the polls V. Giscard d'Estaing always emerged as the conqueror (with about 3 exceptions), and the gap between the conqueror and the conquered never exceeded 6 points. After 1978, and above all following the end of 1979, Giscard d'Estaing's advantage over F. Mitterrand in these hypothetical duels takes on spectacular proportions, up to 60 percent-40 percent. These results are due partially to low mobilization of the electorate of the left by F. Mitterrand; the competition between Rocard and Mitterrand within the PS bothers this electorate and creates the illusion of a much greater domination by V. Giscard d'Estaing. At the beginning of 1980, when the hypothesis is carried out within the PS and the candidate becomes known, V. Giscard d'Estaing starts to break down in the polls. I believe that we have been the victims of an illusion: throughout the whole of 1980, contrary to poll results, the domination of the outgoing president undoubtedly was far less strong already.

Colette Ysmal: Something also needs to be said about the contrast between the campaigns of the two candidates. F. Mitterrand succeeded in constituting quite a remarkable image of a chief of government; the theme of "quiet strength," for example, greatly impressed the voters by opening up a prospect of change without risk and of reasonable power. Settling in on top of that is the divine surprise of the communist score in the first round, which consecrates the failure of a strategy; this score lifted the bond that weighed upon any possible victory of the left: the PCF's place within the coalition. The PCF being unable to do anything except quite simply withdraw, and there being no programmatic agreement between the two parties, F. Mitterrand's victory was able to make the unitarian feelings of the electorate of the left a thing of reality.

Rene Remond: F. Mitterrand's victory is, in fact, the meeting of a movement and a man. About the man, I want to stress the reassuring, the security-inspiring aspect of his personality; his seniority in the opposition even worked in his favor: for 16 years he had been participating in the legitimacy of power as the moral head of the opposition. He did not have to make it be forgotten that he had already been a candidate twice. Finally, the rapidity with which the PS was able to reconstitute a united front must be emphasized. Ever since the congress of Metz, public opinion had been living with the idea that the PS was deeply split, and then it had believed that Michel Rocard's stepping aside was going to weaken and demobilize the party. It now found itself unanimous in its stand in the election battle, at the very time when the majority could not succeed in overcoming its divisions. The unitarian feeling therefore played a dual role in face of the majority and within the left.

Jacques Moreau: I believe also that political mechanisms now have much less control over their electorate than they used to. This helped F. Mitterrand at the expense of the PCF, but it can help others in the future. The mechanisms can no longer decide what they want for an election.

Another comment, I think that the internal debates on the left finally helped the Socialist Party. In the PC/PS polemics, the latter presented the image of a party inclined to become autonomous, as compared to the ideological and organizational tutelage practiced by the Communist Party. The internal debate in the PS showed the French that it could be divided, but above all that it could hold discussions on various themes, and that F. Mitterrand's great strength lay in bringing all of the sensitivities together. This strength comes from the fact that the PS gathered around him starting in 1971. The two debates somewhat enriched F. Mitterrand's candidacy, and put a stop to prejudices against him.

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Finally, the PCF's failure in the first round set off the dynamics in favor of F. Mitterrand. A divergence of 11 points was quite unforeseeable, and this blunt fall shows that the PC's framework is no longer capable of responding to its electorate's requests.

Hugues Portelli: No doubt the mechanisms have less control over their electorate and even their militant basis. For the PCF it must be emphasized that for the first time in its history the period of united action with the Socialists has lasted nearly 10 years instead of the usual two (1934-36, 1944-46). Throughout this period voters and militants acquired united front reflexes, believed in "unity." The Communist leaders thought that, as in the past, they could blot all that out by severely attacking the PS. Their 1977 turn, in the end, did not go over at the base.

Francois Mitterrand's strategy weighed heavily in this failure. In the long run the Socialist leader's campaign began back in 1979 with the PS's congress in Metz. Presenting himself as a symbol of unity on the left against those who, in the PCF or in the PS (Michel Rocard) wanted to drop it and make do with division, F. Mitterrand was able to keep the unitarian voters of the PCF and his own basis which in the majority had clung to the PS during the mutual program period. Once this image was firmly set (especially with the Socialist project) it was that much easier for him to speak up for the unanimist approach, and, to reassure the left center, to rely on the "Rocardians" in the Mitterrand stream.

Finally, another success factor, the socialist political class has a will to rise to power, and was ready to go there, no matter who the candidate was. Unlike the other parties, the PS on the whole, in the long run, waged a campaign rallying around its candidate.

PROJET: Perhaps we should go back for a moment to the matter of the Communist Party's blunt fall.

Colette Ysmal: Nobody had foreseen such a clear setback for the PC. A slow crumbling was expected, like the one which had already occurred between 1973 and 1978 and like what had also appeared in the local ballotings. This blunt setback is not only the failure of an anti-unitarian line; it is also that of a line which appeals to purely reactionary feelings within French society: the struggle against drugs through methods of systematic denouncement; attacks against immigrants. Part of the communist supporters chose not to give in to this type of easy argumentation to which the leaders of the party thought them susceptible.

Jean Charlot: The idea of a slow decline of the PCF had been around for some time. Furthermore, since the beginning of the seventies the party was hesitating between the strategy of unity and the strategy of "Party first." The year 1958 should have been remembered: The PCF had already ruthlessly been taken down a peg in the elections, and it never fully recovered the electorate lost at that time. So the break was not impossible, in spite of the PCF's long digging-in process.

In 1981, even if we go back to the arguments of the "useful vote" in the first round, this vote represents a deep disagreement between the communist voters and the party, since the leadership was making an appeal to strengthen the PC first so as to have a tougher left afterwards. To put the left before the party is, for an entire segment of the communist electorate, a rebellion. But I believe that the "useful vote" was very marginal. The young people from 18 to 20, for example, do not,

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it seems, vote for usefulness; now suddenly they abandoned the PCF, as we said, contrary to their predecessors in 1978. Besides, if there had really been a useful vote, there should have been within the bastions of the PCF a correlative rise in the vote in favor of F. Mitterrand: now the losses of the PCF are far from being recompensed by the socialist gains in these districts. The result of the legislative elections of June will confirm whether or not G. Marchais' failure is truly the result of a deep and lasting break, as I think it is.

Rene Remond: If we attempt to evaluate the results of this election in a long-term outlook, as J. Charlot urges us to do, we get the feeling that the erosion process has been going on in the PCF for a quarter of a century. Sometimes this "retreat" speeds up: in 1958 the PCF lost 30 percent of its electorate, and, as was stated above, it never got it back entirely. Another big letdown today; but there is no telling yet at what level the PCF is going to set its retreat line, no doubt half way between its previous score and the latest result.

Jean-Luc Parodi: If the PCF did not win back all of its electorate after 1958, it is because it no longer has a monopoly on the opposition as it had under the Fourth Republic. Following 1962-65 it has been in competition with the socialists in the opposition. I believe that in the long run this explains the crumbling of the Communist Party.

In 1981 the PCF lost about 5 percent in votes. This loss can be subdivided into several elements. First of all, the phenomenon of the useful vote must not be eliminated completely. In fact, at the end of the electoral campaign, rumor had it that the left would be absent in the second round, that there would be a Giscard-Chirac duel: in face of this risk, the number of communist voters who preferred to vote for Mitterrand as early as the first round through usefulness can be figured at 1 percent. Furthermore, the presidential election is quite specific: in 1965, at the time of the first election with universal suffrage, the absence of a communist candidate was explained by the fact that this was not a "good" election for the PCF and that it had been right to be afraid and to support F. Mitterrand. The election of 1969 did away with that analysis: J. Duclos came out with a good score, and what was due to the shape of the candidacies inside of the Left made us forget the specificity of the election. In 1974 there was no PCF candidate. The possibility cannot be excluded that the voters ready to vote for the PCF in the legislative elections do not want to run the risk, however small it may be, of causing a communist candidate to reach the presidency: because one deputy among others shares the power, but there is no sharing of the presidency. In my opinion the PCF's score in the coming legislative elections should not be as low as the time of the presidential election.

Finally, about F. Mitterrand's image, I should like to point out that a speech opposite to that of J. Moreau can be made. In the polls, up to a recent date, that image was not very favorable, and, in any case, was not so good as that of V. Giscard d'Estaing. I tend to believe that F. Mitterrand won the election in spite of his image and not thanks to it. It was only during the last 3 months of the campaign that F. Mitterrand's image improved in the polls: all told, it is because they are getting ready to vote for him that they stop looking at him with reservations; the vote that is going to be cast for him amends the image that has been made of him. And the vote is going to be cast for him because he is the only candidate in the area of moderate discontent, of tolerable change. Obviously, for these reasons, it was necessary for F. Mitterrand, in his campaign, to facilitate these transfers; I believe that his support team, from this point of view, was very beneficial to him in the posters.

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Jean Charlot: Furthermore F. Mitterrand's image was not so good as the image of his party. For years the Socialist Party has been benefiting from a very good image in French opinion, which is important for the future. From the start the new president has at his disposal an extremely popular party, and consequently the prospect of a president's party, of a PS dominating the left, is possible.

Hugues Portelli: As for knowing what carried the most weight, the victory of the one or the failure of the other, I will say that Giscard's failure was more important than F. Mitterrand's success. In fact, the latter waged a negative campaign, evolving around the rejection of the outgoing candidate. It can be said that Giscard federated the Left thanks to this rejection phenomenon. For the future the problem of the Socialist Party and the new president will be to transform a negative majority into a positive majority; the question can be dispensed with in the short term because the party benefits from the "presidential effect" in the legislative elections, but in the medium term it is much more difficult. Of F. Mitterrand's voters, 52 percent are an odd mixture which will have to be united.

PROJET: Is the new president going to read the constitution in a different way? What is presidential power going to be like in face of parliamentary majority?

Jean-Luc Parodi: This election provides us with several institutional lessons. The first two have to do with the past.

First of all, this election paradoxically revealed the hidden face of parliament. On the eve of the elections of 1978, V. Giscard d'Estaing had said that he would not be able to do anything, if he should find himself face to face with an assembly of the Left. Similarly F. Mitterrand recently declared that he would not be able to govern with an assembly of the Right. Thus, as soon as the assembly has a clear majority, having a will and a chief, it is even stronger than the president. Second victory for parliament, V. Giscard d'Estaing's failure to maintain a homogenous majority coalition. In European democracies the government is composed in proportion to the tendencies of the parliamentary majority, and the leaders of the parliamentary groups are generally represented in the government. Under the Fifth Republic, from 1962-66, the proportion of the Gaullist and Giscardian ministers is more or less the image of their representation in the national assembly. From 1966 to 1969 the proportionality remains respected, but the principal leader of the small party of the majority, V. Giscard d'Estaing, is excluded from the government; his position-taking for the referendum of 1969 is enough to bring about the electoral failure and the departure of General de Gaulle. G. Pompidou, more parliamentary than had been thought, brings V. Giscard d'Estaing back into the government, and from 1969 to 1974 the government is again statistically representative of the parliamentary majority; moreover necessary arbitrations are done within the government. In 1974 a problem arises: the proportion of UDR ministers is no longer either in the image of the parliamentary majority or in the image of V. Giscard d'Estaing's electoral score, but the representatives of all of the tendencies are in the government. In 1976 the leader of the UDR is no longer in the government, and the Gaullist ministers who remain in it are anti-Chirac. That explains J. Chirac's opposition campaign in 1981, and facilitates passage into the opposition of a certain number of his voters. All in all, it can be said that no government of the Fifth Republic can stand, if it is not in the image of the parliamentary majority, and that is the second victory of the assembly.

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The second unwritten law of alternation in the French manner is the following one: as a result of the haphazardness of the electoral schedules, for the past 15 years a legislative or presidential balloting has taken place every 2 or 3 years. Each electoral mandate is therefore relatively short for the power in office. When alternation has been achieved, the new political force which has just conquered the double power has a much longer duration available to it: the president is there for 7 years, and, following dissolution, the assembly is elected for 5 years. Once again we find the situation which General De Gaulle experienced in 1958.

For the first time, thanks to the institutions of the Fifth Republic with which it seems to have thrown in its lot, the left has some duration at its disposal, if it can overcome the differences of opinion among the forces of which it is composed. This is an important asset.

Jean Charlot: The Left furthermore inherits the electoral law instituted by General de Gaulle. What we have before us here is a paradox: the left, and in particular the PS, fought against this law in the name of proportionalist justice. Now this law is going to work in its favor, giving the Socialist Party a considerable bonus in seats, like the one which it formerly gave to the Gaullists: It can create a dominant socialist party which the proportional one would not have made it possible to let loose.

Hugues Portelli: F. Mitterrand stressed the dynamic effect of the presidential balloting to strengthen the electoral weight of the socialist party. For the socialists the strength of the dominant party is at least as important as the parliamentary majority. A dominant party in the parliament can more easily impose its law on the minority parties of the coalition, and likewise it can sometimes operate in the manner of a scratch majority. Moreover, the dominant party, if well organized, can also bear weight on the executive.

Jacques Moreau: The current situation contains another specific facet. It is the first time that a president is coming in with a party which already existed before his election. General de Gaulle had created the UNR and then the UDR, which did not have an autonomous life in relation to the presidency of the republic. Is this party not going to try to obtain a certain autonomy with respect to the president, and how will the latter solve his problems inside of the party?

Given the diversity of the PS, I believe that we are entering into a new system in which the tensions will be of another kind. The existence of the autonomous party perhaps also involves some changes for the opposition: will it be united? With J. Chirac the temptation is great in centrifugal forces in this new opposition. In the parliamentary majority, the PCF can weigh heavily, if it succeeds in keeping a sufficiently large number of seats; if the gap between the PCF and the PS remains a major one, then the maneuvering margin of the PS will be great.

Jean-Luc Parodi: I believe that the bipolar system is being maintained by a kind of dialectics among blocs. If, in the new opposition, there is hope of making off with the following election and thus winning everything, there will be no division; in the opposite case, the most central fraction of the coalition will try to negotiate with the president. In the logic of the system which is going to last for yet a few more years around 50-50, the idea that everything can be won is, I believe, going to come out on top, except in the assumption of a serious crisis between the PCF and the PS. If a crisis with the PCF is going to go so far as to be submitted to an election, then the system would function in some other way.

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On the other hand, I wonder which is going to carry the most weight: the Socialist Party on the functioning of the institutional system, or the constraints of the institutional system on the functioning of the Socialist Party? There has already been a presidentialization of the parties. Can it not be imagined that, all told, a clever representation of the trends within the government will lead the party to a relatively vegetative life, even though its representatives are exercising power?

Hugues Portelli: The relations between the party and the state depend to a great extent on the very evolution of the PS. This party is a conglomerate of diverse tendencies, with a somewhat limited total strength, and in which the number of influential persons is already very high compared with the average of its supporters. Such a party can see its composition change very quickly and appreciably. Will it, throughout the 7-year period, remain solidly behind its leaders? The example of other socialist parties in power gives rise to doubts in this regard.

Furthermore, changing the way of balloting is an item in the Socialists' program, and there is therefore a chance that it will be done: and then no solidarity will exist any longer, each party will fight for itself. The same phenomenon can occur, if there is a crisis within the presidential majority; after all, political life is not limited to the game of the institutions; parties have to reckon with the social forces which they represent. Can one talk about the PCF without bearing in mind its social basis, its traditional forum function, its ideology and its international alliances?

Finally, struggles of tendencies inside of the PS can crop up again about the policy to be conducted by the team in power. Will the institutional element be stronger than the internal weights of the parties? Finally, will the party chief who has become the president of the republic retain the same will to exert discipline over his party and his deputies?

Rene Remond: Let us question ourselves about the future of presidential power. F. Mitterrand has stated his wish to restore the balance between the Elysee and Parliament. What is going to happen in the matter of restoring the balance between the president and the prime minister? In the 24 hours which followed his entrance into the Elysee, F. Mitterrand exercised two of the essential prerogatives of the president of the republic, without there being the slightest challenge: the nomination of the prime minister and the dissolution of the assembly. It is very revealing that these prerogatives should be deemed normal, whereas in 1959, in the terms of the communique announcing that General de Gaulle had appointed Mr Debre, a monarchic deviation from the constitution had been described.

The president's prestige effect is therefore going to be important. Another question has to do with the way in which he will conduct the proceedings of the council of ministers: it is from him that the country expects to get solutions to problems, and not from the prime minister. I believe that the latter will not be able, any more than in the past, to object to the president's will.

Jean Charlot: I think also that the president's prestige and legitimacy will play an essential role in the unity of the new majority and the Socialist Party. Furthermore, the prime minister is a man for reconciling tendencies, which goes along with the quest for consensus. The arbitrations will be made within the governmental team in which all of the tendencies of the PS are represented. But, of course, as events

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and difficulties occur, the test for the truth will come about. The touchstone of governmental solidness will then be discretion about the conflicts which will break out in the council of ministers: if internal difficulties are displayed in the marketplace, there will promptly be a return to a regime of parties or tendencies, as in the Italian Christian Democracy; if, on the other hand, the president has enough authority to impose governmental solidarity, conflicts will be resolved privately.

Jean-Luc Parodi: The very fact that there might be conflicts in the council of ministers would be a novel element. The history of the Fifth Republic shows that that is not where important things happened. And so it is in the council of ministers, in my opinion, that the biggest institutional change will probably take place, most especially if later on there are some communist ministers: it is necessary for each participant to have elements of power in order for the council to hold proceedings on important questions.

Therefore an innovation, even a very timid one, will be the most collegiate and deliberative function of the council of ministers.

Colette Ysmal: It seems to me, in all that we are saying here, that we are talking about a PS that is continuing to live with tendencies polarized around men. I wonder if this party, on which institutional constraints are going to come to bear, is not going to find it necessary to change this game of tendencies. The latter will not disappear completely; but they are not condemned to address themselves to real political projects, and not to men, and to remake themselves?

Hugues Portelli: To me that seems quite true. Furthermore, even if F. Mitterrand had not been elected, it was planned to change the structures of the PS and to do away with the rule of the proportional--which is paradoxical, considering the wish to institute it at the national level. It is not for that reason that tendencies will disappear.

Besides, the PS is going to change composition in terms of new joinings. Up to now the proceedings have been ideological inside of the PS because it happened to be in the opposition. Finally, thinking about it in the long run, will F. Mitterrand chose his successor for 1988? The internal debates in the PS will certainly start up again in the second part of the 7-year period.

PROJET: Other social forces have to get their bearings in face of the new president, union organizations in particular. How will they react? Do they feel linked to the new presidential power, to his party? Are they keeping their autonomy?

Marcel Gonin: In the years 1965-67, in the CFDT, we had had long discussion about autonomy or common strategy with the parties. It seemed obvious to us that the left, once in power, could not remain there without carrying out a realistic economic and social policy, refraining from taking demagogic positions. That implied an effort during the electoral campaign: to get elected promises are necessary, but we have always thought that the left made a few too many, the risk of disappointments later on was great.

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Today everything seems to be going well: in the national council of the CFDT good behaviour and discretion reign. But can this situation last? I think that the Socialist Party, ever since the congress of Metz, has been operating in a manner quite contrary to the citizens' need for political education; and then that does not facilitate the unions' attitude. That fits it with what was being said above about the PCF's weight: changes in strategy and program by the PS during the campaign are proof of the distance between promises and the capacity to perform. Problems should not be viewed solely at the parliamentary level: about the 35 hours, the SMIC, the social benefits, etc., the PCF and the CGT are going to be able to find a game again, and the Socialist Party will perhaps be involved in it to maintain its base among the workers. Will we be able to resist then? Because we have the same claims with regard to F. Mitterrand as with regard to the preceding presidents. I am worried about the possible duration of the current "state of grace."

Between the two rounds of the election G. Seguy took a drubbing about the CGT's setback (in Renault, Cleon, Michelin, etc.), but after the election Krasuki reappeared with the metallurgy CGT--very closely tied to the PCF--and there is a feeling that the communist ministers are going to be exchanged against a certain calm on the CGT's part. It is not certain that the context will be the same 6 months from now: the situation is dangerous for the unions. The government is likely to give in more easily than we would to the more or less unattainable claims of the CGT. From this point of view, Mr Rocard was a better vehicle for the Mendes image of a certain realism; he could have contributed to the winning of the election on more realistic grounds, with fewer risks of disappointment later on.

Jacques Moreau: Unionism is in trouble, especially since 1978. That is what led it to do everything to cause the victory of May 1981 to last. There in the union circles there is a stronger conscience than in political circles. This realistic behavior of the unions can topple over from one day to the next, if the government, for its part, is not realistic. For example, the CFDT is asking for an increase of 10 percent of the SMIC whereas certain newspapers say that an increase of 20 percent can be made without any problem. If on July 1 the government increases the SMIC by more than 10 percent will be because it disavows the behavior of the union organizations.

Besides, the CGT can partially get back its action capacity. But its current difficulties in mobilization are deeper than is generally thought. It can still control movements, but not so well as it could 10 years ago; the phenomenon is similar to the one which affects the parties.

If the workers are disappointed by the governmental decisions, the atmosphere may get worse, and the unions may give up their realism. One of the keys to the problem is the following: the alliance between unions and government will oblige employers to make enough concessions on problems of power to gratify union leaders in some measure. This is one of the questions being discussed within the PS: shall we give in to quantitative demogogy or shall we seek new compromises necessitating concessions on problems of power? Within the next 6 months things will come to a head.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

LEROY AVOIDS MOSCOW MEETING--Roland Leroy has refused to go to Moscow, although he was summoned by CPSU officials to attend a meeting on 7 July of editors of Western European communist newspapers. The reason for the meeting: a "friendly discussion of the international situation." Has the former Seine-Maritime deputy, who is considered the champion of the PCF's hard-line wing, become a Eurocommunist? Unless he has obeyed the new orders for national independence, in effect since the appointment of communist ministers to the government. [Text] [Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 11-17 Jul 81 p 35] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"] 11915

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

POLLS SHOW 12 TO 26 PERCENT OF BASQUES FAVOR INDEPENDENCE

Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish 13 Jul 81 pp 18-23

[Article by Jose Manuel Arijia]

[Text] Fond of their fueros [privilege or exemption] and traditions, the 2.1 million inhabitants of the Basque Country want to be an autonomous people today within a democratic and pluralist Spain.

This is the finding of a poll conducted 2½ months ago by the Center for Sociological Research and in which the overwhelming majority of the Basque people reaffirmed their trust in their autonomous institutions. Only 12 percent came out in favor of independence.

Twenty months ago, shortly after the Autonomy Statute was passed, 26 percent of these same Basques advocated independence, according to a poll by the same center. We could conclude that now that their autonomous institutions are in place, the Basques are drifting further and further away from capricious desires for independence.

Another poll, conducted by the FOESSA [Promotion of Social Studies and Applied Sociology] Foundation in 1979 and released last week by the press of the Catolica Publishing House, shows a different reality. According to this survey, 50 percent of the Basque people advocated independence at the time and considered the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty] patriotic and idealistic.

The FOESSA report has prompted a war of polls and public statements.

On the same day that ETA terrorists murdered an army lieutenant and a Civil Guard recruit, the newspaper YA published a poll by FOESSA that asserted that 50 percent of the Basques considered ETA militants patriots and idealists.

Alarmist Utilization of the Report

The report by FOESSA, which is linked to Catholic circles, also disclosed that 63 percent of Basques felt desires for independence ranging from "very strong" to "very weak." The release of this information caused a genuine upheaval in the Basque Country and throughout the nation.

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In a hastily drawn up note the civilian governors of the three Basque provinces entered the fray by immediately criticizing the poll. Employing the adjectives "inadequate and partial," "far from reliable" and "inadmissible," the governmental authorities attempted to refute some of the conclusions that FOESSA reached.

Marcelino Oreja, the governor general of the Basque Country, told this magazine: "We have to place the FOESSA report in its time frame, in other words, 1979, just after the statute, which meant autonomy on paper only, had been approved. The situation is different today. Political developments in the Basque Country have been very rapid since then: gains in home rule, a rejection of violence, abandonment of the armed struggle by the 'polimilis,' etc."

The leaders of the Basque Left (EE) told CAMBIO 16 that the FOESSA poll was being used as an alarmist tool. "Taking data out of context from a scientific report is far from conscientious and can be rejected as an alarmist move. The civilian governors themselves have shown that they are not very conscientious by using the data from the Logos Agency, not from the complete report."

The spokesmen of the PNV [Basque Nationalist Party] as well as Basque Socialists and Communists spoke to this magazine and likewise voiced their surprise, saw outside interests in the publication of the report and asserted that over the past 2 years the major rallies against terrorism, such as the Ryan affair, have changed the situation.

Two sociologists from the University of Bilbao stated that "what the FOESSA study gives us is a very vague and, to us, not very valid indicator" and that "to ask about independence and self-determination, not federalism and autonomy, is a serious mistake."

To middle-of-the-road sociologist Juan Diez Nicolas, "the report seems exaggerated. The figures are very hard to believe, especially in comparison to other similar reports I have seen on the Basque Country."


What the political parties and experts do agree on is that there are people who want independence, but no more than 15 percent of the population at the most.

In contrast to this alarming poll published in the FOESSA report, other polls conducted by the state-run Center for Sociological Research (CIS) yielded completely different percentages. The war of the polls had begun, and its backdrop was the Basque Country, the most problem-ridden and strife-torn region in Spain.

According to the CIS poll, to which CAMBIO 16 had access, only 26 percent advocated Basque independence at a time when FOESSA was saying that 63 percent of the Basques it polled felt "very strong" to "very weak" desires for independence.

As far as views on the ETA militants are concerned, according to the April 1981 CIS poll, 13 percent of the Basque population regarded them as patriots and idealists while 41 percent considered them madmen and criminals. Either these responses are in open contradiction with the FOESSA report on this point too, or else things have changed a great deal over the past 2 years in the Basque Country.

Advocates of Independence



Source: CIS poll

Opinion poll experts say that a survey is an "image" of what people think at a given moment and amid a specific climate. The FOESSA poll was conducted for it by the specialized institute DATA after the autonomy referendum in the Basque Country in October-November 1979 amid great social tensions.

Is a "photograph" of what Basques thought then valid today? The specialists consulted by this magazine replied that the views 2 years ago on independence and the ETA would probably differ greatly from the "photograph" that would be obtained in the summer of 1981.

This judgment is corroborated not only by subsequent polls but also by political developments over the succeeding 20 months. The denunciations of

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terrorism, the drift away from ETA positions by nationalist parties like the EE and PNV, the mass demonstrations against slayings, the explicit condemnations of ETA violence by the Basque Government, etc, illustrate the isolation and waning influence of the Basque terrorist organization.

Some 128 civilians and men in uniform have been slain by terrorists from the time that FOESSA had the poll done in October 1979 until the present.

The CIS poll conducted last April asked what people thought about autonomy. Some 7 percent said they were centralists; 43 percent thought the home rule system was fine, and 12 percent felt that the Basque Country ought to be completely independent.

Taking other CIS studies into account, we can see that the 12 percent support for independence shows a continuing falloff for the separatist alternative, a falloff that began last year.

What Do You Think of the Members of the ETA?

<u>Description</u>	<u>FOESSA 1979*</u>	<u>CIS 1981</u>
Patriots	17 percent	2
Idealists	33	11
Madmen, criminals, tools	42	41
Don't know/No answer	14	46

*The numbers add up to more than 100 because of possible double answers, although the report does not mention this.

The support for independence reflected in the four polls taken by the center (in 1976, 12 percent; in 1979, 26 percent; in 1980, 18 percent, and in 1981, 12 percent) indicates something that is corroborated by another study done for CAMBIO 16 by the Consulta Institute (in 1977, 15 percent of the Basques supported independence). This fact can be expressed as follows: backing for independence increased from Franco's death until the home rule process took shape and began to decline after the statute went into effect and ETA violence escalated.

In other words, the Federal Government's delays and hesitancies during the initial phase of the transition only served to encourage independence sentiments. In contrast, when home rule began to take effect and the Basque Country was given its self-government institutions, the public's desire for independence plummeted.

In 1981 only 1 in 10 Basques wants independence. "Gora Espana Askatuta" seems to be the watchword today of an autonomous people in a democratic country.

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Autonomy or Independence (CIS, April 1981)

Advocates of centralism	7 percent
Advocates of the home rule system	43
Advocates of independence	12
Don't know/no answer	38

Trend in Views on Independence

	<u>FOESSA 1979</u>	<u>CIS 1981</u>
Very strong desire for independence	12	
Quite strong desire for independence	24	12
Quitewweak desire for independence	15	
Very weak desire for independence	12	
No desire for independence	29	50
No answer	7	38

Where on the political spectrum are the advocates of autonomy and independence?

According to the CIS poll, only the supporters of Herri Batasuna (HB) comprise a majority of independence advocates (52 percent). The links between the political HB and the terrorist ETA have once again been established in their support for separatism. In contrast, most of the voters of the EE (48 percent) and the PNV (70 percent) embraced the statute, just like the nationwide political parties.

If we take the origin of the people polled into account, 17 percent of those born in the Basque Country lean towards independence, while only 6 percent of immigrants there do.

With regard to what Basques think of the ETA terrorists, a breakdown of the April 1981 CIS poll shows that 2 percent feel they are "patriots," 11 percent consider them "idealists," 14 percent feel they are "madmen," and 27 percent describe them as "criminals." Some 46 percent preferred not to answer this question.

In most of the polls on political issues conducted in Spain, between 20 and 30 percent of the people cannot or decline to answer. They thus go into the sizable category of "don't know/no answer" in poll questionnaires.

In light of the tense and fear-tinged situation that part of Basque society is living in, it is not strange that so many people decline to answer. Questioned by this magazine, our experts in the field stated that four different individuals and homes have to be contacted in the Basque Country before one of them will agree to reply.

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For these reasons it is also surprising that there were so few "don't know/no answer" responses in the 1979 DATA poll reproduced in the controversial FOESSA report. Only 7 percent did not answer the question on their desires for independence, and 14 percent did not offer their opinion of ETA terrorists.

Despite the small number of people surveyed who declined to answer, the annotators of the FOESSA report underscored the "fear" factor when it came time for people to reply.

Doubts About the FOESSA Report

In light of the responses obtained in 1979 concerning terrorism, the FOESSA sociologists acknowledged: "The serious problem is that for complex reasons the ETA terrorists have benefited from a positive image as patriots and idealists and that public opinion in the Basque Country did not dare to describe the terrorists as criminals or madmen and tended to blame right- and left-wing extremists as well as the government and the forces of public order. We used the word 'public' because private opinion might have been different but for a series of reasons, among which it would be absurd to exclude fear, it was not expressed and, therefore, was not real and visible in its consequences."

After this ambiguous wording they add: "Although the nonreplies, the public mood of muffling denunciations, the evasion by ambiguous responses and, probably, fear diminish the validity of the answers, there can be no doubt that a minority of the population considers those involved in terrorist activities patriots (17 percent), as against 5 percent who regard them as criminals and 8 percent as madmen." Here the authors of the comments did a number juggling act to subtract the 33 percent who called them idealists from the 17 percent who termed them patriots. In other words, 50 percent of the Basques, which is no minority, support the ETA, according to the poll's own data.

The words "fear," "did not dare" or "pressures of the prevailing mood" that the FOESSA report cites as latent feelings in Basque society at the time it conducted its poll, certainly could have skewed its results, which is also acknowledged elsewhere in the study when it discusses the political party vote: "A higher percentage in the poll than in the electorate said they voted for the PNV, while less than half of those who actually voted for the UCD and CD said so in the poll."

Waning Support for Independence

Aside from possible errors in the findings of the FOESSA survey, its place in time is an indispensable factor in understanding it. The authors of the study themselves, sociologist Juan J. Linz and three other specialists, so indicate: "The first thing that must be pointed out is that the data, whether well or poorly quoted and interpreted, refer to the year 1979 and, therefore, might or might not reflect current realities. The date of the study has been overlooked in this entire unfortunate controversy. The year

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1979 was a period during which this issue was highly politicized; we must not forget that home rule had not yet been institutionalized and that the ongoing terrorist activities could have altered the climate of opinion," they said in a press release, frightened by the hue and cry that their study triggered.

The CIS poll seems to prove these researchers right. There has been a change in Basque society, and support for the ETA and desires for independence have fallen today to a very low level, even below the vote percentage that the Herri Batasuna abertzale [patriotic] coalition obtained at the last legislative election.

Attitudes Regarding Autonomy According to Party (CIS 1981)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>Supporters of</u>			<u>PSOE</u>	<u>UCD</u>	<u>Origin</u>	
		<u>HB</u>	<u>EE</u>	<u>PNV</u>			<u>Basque</u>	<u>Immi- grants</u>
Advocates of centralism	7	2	--	--	11	11	5	8
Advocates of Autonomy Statute	44	31	48	70	53	45	46	47
Advocates of independence	12	52	29	14	5	1	17	6
Don't know/no answer	37	15	23	16	31	43	32	39

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MILITARY

FRANCE

MATRA 'SCORPION' RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEM

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 13 Jun 81 p 107

[Text] The reconnaissance system by Scorpion remote-controlled vehicle developed by MATRA [Aeronautical Equipment and Production] and Thomson-CSF was presented for the first time at the stand of the Missile Technology Directorate (DTEn), which financed exploratory development (DTEn/STER [Telephone Finance Corporation] contract). This presentation marked the result of the competition initiated between MATRA and AEROSPATIALE concerning the design of the future French RPV [Remotely-Piloted Vehicle]. The Scorpion is a remote-controlled device for reconnaissance and target designation on the battlefield. The propeller-driven vehicle is designed to be launched and recovered from unimproved sites. It has a 3-hour flight endurance and a 50-kilometer guidance radius. It is equipped with a stabilized optronic sensor for observation. It makes automatic target tracking and target designation (tanks and so on) for the benefit of terminal-guided weapons. The remote-control and video link systems are protected against jamming. The device has a low degree of vulnerability owing to its small size, its low noise level and its reduced radar and infrared signatures.

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